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EXORCISING THE GHOST:
FINDING A RIGHT AND A REMEDY
IN ARTICLE 36 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION
ON CONSULAR RELATIONS
1. INTRODUCTION
This nation must manifest integrity in our treaties with foreign
countries. To honor the provisions of Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations... mandates a sense ofjustice
and decency. To do anything less is a severe erosive compromise
of our very essence equal if not greater than a Constitutional
violation.
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
2 ("Vienna Convention")
convened in Vienna, Austria in 1963 and produced an ambitious treaty to codify
international common law consular relationships. Approved by the United States
Senate on October 22, 1969, and ratified by President Richard M. Nixon on
November 12, 1969, 4 this multilateral treaty has sparked a continuing debate in both
domestic and international fora questioning whether the language in one particular
article creates an individual right.
The controversy flows from the language of Article 36 of the Convention,
which, according to some courts and many scholars, creates a right accruing to the
individual.' This is remarkable because most treaties do not create individual rights;
rather, treaties function as agreements between sovereigns and as such are generally
only enforceable by national governments. However, Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention is different and provides that if an individual is detained by law
enforcement in a foreign country, the detainee has a right to access the consular
officials of his nationality. Additionally, the arresting authority is required to notify
the individual of this right at the onset of his detention. This short, two-paragraph
portion of the Vienna Convention has sparked numerous court cases and an entire
body of independent scholarly work. Yet this treaty and its implications still float
1. United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1979) (Takasugi, J.,
dissenting).
2. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
3. Luke T. Lee, Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, 571 INT'L
CONCILIATION 41,41 (1969).
4. William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of Rights,
Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 257, 268 (1998). The treaty officially became
United States law on December 24, 1969. Id. at 269.
5. See discussion infra Part II.
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on the periphery of legal consciousness, leading to a cycle of non-compliance in the
United States.
The jurisprudence regarding the creation of this individual right is unsettled in
the United States. Some courts have found that, like most other international
agreements, any rights created under this article accrue not to the individual, but
rather to the signatory nation; therefore, violations are only enforceable by and
among nations. Other courts have determined that the treaty does create an
individual right, but that it is not a right on par with fundamental rights such as the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. Accordingly, these courts find that, absent some showing by the
individual of prejudice to the outcome of the proceedings, no plausible criminal
remedy exists for a violation of Article 36.
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, with its "tortuous and checkered
background,"6 seeks, among other things, to establish the important protective
function of consuls.7 Many courts have struggled with the United States' violations
of this treaty, fully aware that if the United States does not move towards even and
full compliance, it endangers its own citizens traveling abroad. When charged with
a crime in an unfamiliar foreign justice system, American citizens need the
protective shield that access to a representative of the United States government
provides.
In South Carolina, this matter was addressed for the first time in late 2002 in
State v. Lopez.! In Lopez, the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that, despite
the prosecution's admitted violation of Article 36, no prejudice to the defendant
resulted from the violation, and the conviction of the defendant was therefore
affirmed.9 The case, explored below in Part II, is a typical challenge to the actions
of law enforcement officials under the Vienna Convention. As such, Lopez is
remarkable only in that the defendant was astute enough, either through his own
actions or that of counsel, to determine that a right existed and to raise the violation
in the trial court. The issue of raising the violation in the trial court is an important
element of the overall debate. If not raised in the trial court, the value of the right
is forever lost and an individual, unaware of the right's existence, may find himself
trapped in the unfortunate quagmire of procedural default. The individual thus loses
the ability to challenge his conviction based on a violation of a right he did not
know he had.' °
This Comment explores the state of the law on Article 36 and suggests that
6. LUKE T. LEE, VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATION 107 (1966).
7. Id.
8. 352 S.C. 373, 574 S.E.2d 210 (Ct. App. 2002).
9. Id. at 382, 574 S.E.2d at 214.
10. In a recent United States Supreme Court order denying a petition for writ of certiorari, Justice
John Paul Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which he noted that "[a]pplying the procedural default
rule to Article 36 claims is not only in direct violation of the Vienna Convention, but it is also
manifestly unfair." Torres v. Mullin, 124 S. Ct. 919 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 55: 569
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 12
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss3/12
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
because violations of the Vienna Convention do not appear to be remediable in most
criminal settings, courts can and should allow parties to explore greater
enforceability through actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau ofNarcotics." By raising the specter
of monetary and injunctive relief, courts will promote enforcement of the treaty.
"Violation[s] of the Vienna Convention [are] costless to those committing the
violations,"' 2 and non-compliance in the United States will continue unless and until
costs are imposed on willful violators.
Part II of this Comment explores the state of the current law illustrated by the
South Carolina case State v. Lopez'" and provides an exploration of Article 36 of
the Vienna Convention, including a general background on treaty enforcement in
the courts of the United States. Part III argues that Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention does create an individual right, explores the United States' official
position that an individual right does not exist in the treaty, and considers the
Supreme Court's most recent discussion of this question. Part IV proposes that the
remedy for such violations should include civil liability through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
II. THE STATE OF THE LAW
A. State v. Lopez
In late 2002, State v. Lopez'4 addressed a Vienna Convention violation as a
matter of first impression in South Carolina. Domitilo Lopez, "a Mexican national
residing legally in the United States,"' 5 was arrested in June 1998 during a traffic
stop. A consensual search of his vehicle yielded cocaine, and Lopez was indicted
for trafficking more than 500 grams of cocaine.'6 During the course of his plea
hearing, Lopez twice turned down the court's offer of an interpreter.'
7 With the
advice of counsel, Lopez, advised of the charges against him and the constitutional
rights that he would be waiving, entered a plea of guilty.'" Thus, circumstances
indicated that Lopez's decision to plead guilty was one made of his own free will.'
9
The trial court determined Lopez's plea was knowing and voluntary, and pursuant
to the plea agreement, the court sentenced Lopez to "fourteen years in prison, with
credit for time served, and imposed a statutorily mandated $100,000 fine."
20 Lopez
11. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
12. Joan Fitzpatrick, The Unreality of International Law in the United States and the LaGrand
Case, 27 YALE J. INT'LL. 427, 428 (2002).
13. 352 S.C. at 373, 574 S.E.2d at 210.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 376, 574 S.E.2d at 211.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 377, 574 S.E.2d at 212.
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subsequently moved to withdraw his plea based on the prosecution's violation of
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.2" Lopez argued that had he known of his right
to contact the Mexican consulate, he would have secured a translator to "help him
better understand the 'ramifications and consequences' of his decision to enter a
guilty plea."2 The State admitted Lopez had not been advised of his rights under
the Vienna Convention, stating it had "unintentionally failed"23 to advise him of
those rights. The trial court thereafter denied Lopez's motion to withdraw his plea,
and Lopez filed an appeal.24
The South Carolina Court of Appeals decision in Lopez is indicative of the
posture of most criminal cases addressing this issue. The court of appeals
determined that "[nlights created by international treaties do not create rights
equivalent to constitutional rights,"25 and as such, for Lopez to prevail he needed
to establish some evidence of prejudice to the outcome of his case.26 Lopez argued
that if he had been informed of his right under the Vienna Convention, he would
have contacted the Mexican consulate in an effort to secure a translator.27 The court
found that the trial court record contained ample evidence of Lopez's ability to
understand and comprehend English, that he had never requested an interpreter, and
that, in fact, he had twice turned down the court's offer of a court-appointed
translator.28 The court of appeals held that "a violation of rights under the Vienna
Convention... provides no basis for withdrawing a free and voluntary plea of
guilty," and Lopez "failed to demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice as the result
of the State's failure to make him aware of his rights under the Treaty."29 The court
affirmed Lopez's conviction.3"
There are several noteworthy aspects of the court of appeals' rather cursory
opinion. First, the court did not undertake any analysis of whether Lopez had
standing to bring a challenge to his conviction under Article 36. The court focused
on the trial court record without even addressing the issue of whether Lopez could
pursue this violation on his own behalf or whether the right to raise the violation
belonged only to the United Mexican States. This is important because if no
standing exists, no right exists. The court indicated that Lopez failed to show he was
prejudiced by "the State's failure to make him aware of his rights under the
Treaty."'" The court proceeded on the assumption that the rights mentioned in
21. Id.
22. Id. (quoting Record on Appeal at 25, Lopez (No. 3578)).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 376-77, 574 S.E.2d at 211-12.
25. State v. Lopez, 352 S.C. 373, 381, 574 S.E.2d 210, 214 (Ct. App. 2002).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 381-82, 574 S.E.2d at 214.
29. Id. at 382, 574 S.E.2d at 215.
30. Id.
31. State v. Lopez, 352 S.C. 373, 382, 574 S.E.2d 210, 215 (Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 55: 569
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Article 36(l)(b) accrued to Lopez, and therefore it was "his own actions '32 that
prevented his plea withdrawal. Even the court's finding that "international treaties
do not create rights equivalent to constitutional rights ' 33 does not foreclose the
existence of a right that belongs to the foreign national, but merely clarifies that the
right does not rise to the level of a constitutional right.
Second, the opinion does not indicate whether the State ever affirmatively
complied with its duty to inform Lopez of his rights under the Treaty. Lopez was
arrested in June 1998, the plea hearing was held in January 1999, and the court held
a hearing on Lopez's motion to withdraw his guilty plea in December 1999."4 The
only reference in the opinion to whether the State ever complied with its duty is the
court's notation that the State failed to advise Lopez of his right to consular
notification and access.35 Mentioning whether the State had performed its duty was
not essential to the court's determination of Lopez's case. However, the omission
leaves the impression that the court either thought it was a moot point because the
violation had been raised by the defendant, or that it was unimportant whether
Lopez was ever formally advised of his rights. If the latter is the case, the court may
have failed to recognize an opportunity to stem the very real potential for repetition
of violations of this treaty obligation, particularly as the population of foreign
nationals increases in South Carolina.
36
B. The Vienna Convention and Article 36
The Vienna Convention, as noted above, was undertaken in an attempt to
memorialize international common law arrangements affecting consular
relationships between nations. The treaty addresses a variety of the elements of
consular relationships, including the many responsibilities of consuls. These
responsibilities include furthering both economic and cultural relations between the
sending state and the receiving state,37 as well as performing a variety of ministerial
duties.38
However, Article 36 is slightly different. In the midst of a multilateral treaty
that seeks to formalize official relationships, the following two paragraphs have
sparked a vocal international debate:
32. Id. at 382, 574 S.E.2d at 214.
33. Id. at 381, 574 S.E.2d at 214.
34. Id. at 376-77, 574 S.E.2d at 211-12.
35. Id. at 377, 574 S.E.2d at 212.
36. Cf. Cheraine Stanford, Lancaster Weighs Hiring Courtroom Interpreters, THE STATE
(Columbia, S.C.), July 25, 2003, at B5 (noting an increase in native Spanish-speaking individuals
having interactions with the court system).
37. In this context, the sending state is the nation of which the foreign national is a citizen, and
receiving state indicates the nation in which the foreign national is physically located. United States v.
Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 388 (6th Cir. 2001).
38. Aceves, supra note 4, at 264.
20041
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Communication and contact with nationals of the sending State
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions
relating to nationals of the sending State: (a) consular officers
shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State
and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall
have the same freedom with respect to communication with and
access to consular officers of the sending State; (b) if he so
requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall,
without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if,
within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in
any other manner.... The said authorities shall inform the person
concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the
receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws
and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes
for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended.39
The language of Article 36 appears to be a two-pronged compromise between
the delegations' competing ideas of what duties should be incumbent upon the
receiving state.4" Some delegations wanted to impose a mandatory obligation on the
receiving state to inform the consuls of the sending state that their compatriots had
been detained, while other delegations wanted to forgo such an obligation
altogether.4 The second part of the compromise appears in the language at the
beginning of Article 36(b). The phrase "[i]f he so requests" was inserted in
response to several delegations' concerns over the foreign national's "autonomy and
rights under the Treaty."42
Article 36 operates to protect the individual in two important ways: it both
allows the detained individual access to representatives of her government and
protects the individual by allowing governments to have access to their citizens to
ensure fair treatment in foreign judicial systems.43
39. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. at 100-01, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292-94.
40. Lee, supra note 3, at 63.
41. Id.
42. Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Search for
the Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 565, 571 (1997).
43. Aceves, supra note 4, at 259.
[Vol. 55:569
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Treaties, as agreements between nations, are generally enforceable by and
among nations, usually through diplomatic and political means." Treaties generally
do not create individually enforceable rights, although there are some notable
exceptions.4" In those instances where individual rights are implicated, whether a
private right of action is created turns on the interpretation of the agreement.4
6
"Whether or not treaty violations can provide the basis for particular claims or
defenses thus appears to depend upon the particular treaty and claim involved.
47
Self-executing treaties carry the force and weight of statutory enactments.
48
While the doctrine of self-execution means that no congressional legislation beyond
ratification is needed to implement the treaty, "self-executing" in the international
law sense also means that the treaty must provide an individual right of action.
49
Treaties are given force and effect and are binding on the states through the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.5" "The Supremacy Clause
transformed instruments that had previously been operative on [nations] as political
bodies and enforceable only by military force into instruments operative on
individuals and enforceable in the courts."5 ' Because of the structure of the
language of the Supremacy Clause,52 treaties are on parity with legislative
enactments and, because "the United States recognizes the doctrine of lexposterior
44. United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56,63 (lst Cir. 2000) (citing United States Department of State
material).
45. See, e.g.. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655,667 (1992) (finding if extradition
treaty is self-executing, court must enforce it on behalf of individual if it implicates individual rights);
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 442-43 (1989) (indicating some
treaties create private rights of action for foreign corporations to recover compensation in United States
courts).
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 907 cmt. a
(1987).
47. United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2000).
48. Valentine v. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 10 (1936) (treaties are "to be regarded in courts ofjustice
as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever [the treaty] operates of itself without the aid of any
legislative provision") (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)); see also Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (finding that a treaty is the "law of the land as an act of
Congress... whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or
subject may be determined").
49. Kadish, supra note 42, at 586-87; see also Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v.
Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1988). There is some disagreement on this point in both
commentary and in the courts. See Roberto Iraola, Federal Criminal Prosecutions and the Right to
Consular Notification under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 179, 211
nn.56-57 (2002) (discussing controversy).
50. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 201 (1975) ("[A] legislated ratification of [a treaty]
is a '(Law) of the United States... made in Pursuance' of the Constitution and, therefore, like 'all
Treaties made,' is made binding upon affected States by the Supremacy Clause.")
51. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L.
REv. 1082, 1097 (1992).
52. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
2004]
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derogatpriori,'5 3 can be modified by subsequently passed legislation. 4
When interpreting a treaty or its provisions, courts "first look to its terms to
determine its meaning." 5 If the meaning is not clear from the face of the treaty,
courts cannot infer meanings from the presence or absence of language, but "[i]t is
a familiar rule that the obligations... should be liberally construed so as to give
effect to the apparent intentions of the parties. 56 In an attempt to determine these
intentions and resolve textual ambiguities, courts look to the records of the drafting,
debate, and negotiation of the treaty,57 to other signatories' interpretation of the
treaty,58 to interpretative material of the Executive Branch agency charged with
enforcement,59 and to the decisions of any international tribunal charged with
interpretation of the treaty.
60
In effectuating treaties, "the procedural rules of the forum [nation] govern the
implementation of the treaty in that [nation]."16 ' The United States Supreme Court
indicated that this idea is manifest in the Vienna Convention in section 2 of Article
36, which states the rights accorded in the treaty "shall be exercised in conformity
with the laws and regulations of the receiving State" so long as "said laws and
regulations .. enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights
accorded under this Article are intended."62
III. BURIED RIGHT: THE RIGHT OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN ARTICLE 36
A. An Individual Right Revealed
Armed with the framework for interpreting treaties, this Comment now turns
to whether the language of Article 36 creates a right in the individual: not only a
right of access to one's national representatives, but also a right to be notified of
such a privilege. Courts are split on this issue,63 and the Supreme Court has not
53. Aceves, supra note 4, at 289. This phrase literally means "a later law prevails over an earlier
one." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 924 (7th ed. 1999).
54. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) ("[W]hen a statute which is subsequent in time is
inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty null."); see also Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (finding treaties subject to such acts as Congress passes for
their "enforcement, modification, or repeal").
55. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 663 (1992).
56. Valentine v. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 10 (1936).
57. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 400 (1985).
58. Id. at 404.
59. United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 67 (1st Cir. 2000).
60. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998).
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36, para. 2, 21 U.S.T. at 101,596 U.N.T.S.
at 292).
63. Compare United States v. Torres-Del Muro, 58 F. Supp. 2d 931 (C.D. I11. 1999) (finding
individually enforceable right), and United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir.
1980) (stating that "[t]he right established by the.., treaty is a personal one"), and Standt v. City of
New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding individual right enforceable under § 1983),
[Vol. 55: 569
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given a definitive answer. However, in the most recent case where the Court
addressed a Vienna Convention violation, the Court did not question the individual
petitioner's standing-a seminal element ofjusticiability-to raise a violation of the
provisions of Article 36. More importantly, the Court indicated, albeit in dicta, that
the treaty "arguably confers on an individual the right to consular assistance
following arrest."'
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention is "an awkward place to enumerate the
rights of an individual national. '6' Nevertheless, it is evident from the clarity of the
Article's language, compared with original wording of the Article," that the
Convention delegates knew the import of the language used. The language of
Article 36 does not directly "require the receiving state to notify the consular post
that its national has been detained;, 67 rather, the treaty explicitly states that the right
belongs to and is triggered by the detained individual. The beginning phrase of
Article 36(1)(b), "if he so requests," places the burden and privilege to exercise the
right of contact squarely on the detained individual.68 The fact that the individual
triggers notification, coupled with the mandatory language stating that the arresting
"authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this
sub-paragraph, '69 indicates the signatories' intent to create a right in the individual
and impose a duty on the receiving State. A British amendment added the
obligatory language in subparagraph (b) "to avoid any possible abuse by local
authorities or misunderstanding by the person involved."7° Surely if the signatories,
including the United States, meant for this article to create only a derivative right
enforceable by and among nations, then the original language, wherein the
individual national is not even mentioned, would have won the day. "This
provision does not entail arcane or obscure parlance, or require the application of
complex notions or of concepts that are difficult to understand or decipher."' The
with United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding the Vienna Convention does
not create individual right), and United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding
treaty does not create private, judicially enforceable right).
64. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.
65. Kadish, supra note 42, at 593.
66. As originally put forth, Article 36(b) provided: "The competent authorities shall, without
undue delay, inform the competent consulate of the sending State if, within its district, a national of that
State is committed to prison or to custody pending trial or detained in any other manner." Kadish, supra
note 42, at 570 n.21 (quoting 2 United Nations Conference on Consular Relations: Official Records,
at 3, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.25/6, U.N. Sales No. 63.X.2 (1963)).
67. Lori Fisler Damrosch, Interpreting US. Treaties in Light ofHuman Rights Values, 46 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 43, 52 (2002-2003).
68. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36, para. l(b), 21 U.S.T. at 101,596 U.N.T.S. at 292.
This is only true for those countries in which an arrest of one of its citizens does not trigger a mandatory
notification provision. See http://www.travel.state.gov/notificationl.htrml (State Department material
indicating some countries, because of separate bilateral agreements, require mandatory notification).
69. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36, para. l(b), 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292
(emphasis added).
70. LEE, supra note 6, at 114 (citing statement of United Kingdom delegation).
71. United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 71 (1st Cir. 2000) (Torruella, C.J., dissenting).
2004]
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clarity of the words and their implication for the individual should not be ignored.
Some courts have pointed to the preamble language of the treaty in an effort to
show that the treaty itself specifically disavows any creation of individual rights.72
The preamble language states, in part, that "the purpose of such privileges and
immunities [enumerated in the treaty] is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the
efficient performance of functions by consular posts on behalf of their respective
States. 73 Upon examination, however, the language of the entire preamble speaks
to the reason for the inclusion of these privileges and immunities in the treaty as not
to "benefit individuals," but rather to "contribute to the development of friendly
relations among nations. ' 74 The preamble, viewed in context, simply recognizes
that consuls are not afforded the immunities outlined in the treaty as personal
benefits. The privileges allow consuls to fully function in their official capacities,




B. The International Court of Justice and Inter-American Court of Human
Rights: Persuasive Precedent
When the United States became a signatory to the Vienna Convention, it also
became a signatory to the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement
of Disputes.76 By participating in this Optional Protocol, the assenting signatories
agreed that disputes regarding the application or interpretation of the Vienna
Convention would be within the mandatory jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice ("ICJ"). 77 In the 2001 LaGrand matter, the ICJ determined that the treaty
does create a right in the individual.7 8
Karl and Walter LaGrand were German citizens who, in 1982, were convicted
of murder and sentenced to death in Arizona state court.79 While Arizona
authorities were aware no later than 1984 that the LaGrands were German
nationals,"0 German officials only became aware of the LaGrands' convictions and
72. See id. at 62; Sorensen v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ 3356,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15090
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2000). ("[T]he Vienna Convention's preamble explicitly disclaims any attempt to
create individual rights.").
73. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 79, 596 U.N.T.S. at 262.
74. Id.
75. Kadish, supra note 42, at 594.
76. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement
of Disputes, 21 U.S.T. at 325-29, 596 U.N.T.S. at 488-512.
77. Id. at art. I, 21 U.S.T. at 326, 596 U.N.T.S. at 488.
78. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27,2001), available at http://212.153.
43.18/icjwww/idocketligusigusframe.htm.
79. State v. LaGrand, 734 P.2d 563, 565 (Ariz. 1987).
80. Daniel J. Lehman, The Federal Republic of Germany v. The United States of America: The
Individual Right to Consular Access, 20 LAW & INEQ. 313,340 n.77 (2002). There was some dispute
as to when authorities were aware that the LaGrands were German nationals and also as to who those
authorities were. Id.
. [Vol. 55: 569
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pending executions in 1992." It was not until sixteen years after their convictions
and sentences, on December 21, 1998, that the LaGrands were formally notified of
their rights under the Vienna Convention."
2 As a result of the failure of state
officials to notify the LaGrands of their rights under the Vienna Convention and the
execution of Karl LaGrand on February 24, 1999, Germany brought suit in the ICJ
in March 1999 on behalf of itself and the LaGrands.
3 While an ICJ ruling is only
binding as to the parties before it, the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention,
to which the United States is a signatory, provides that an ICJ interpretation of the
treaty is authoritative. 4 The United States appeared and defended the case, thereby
binding itself to the ruling. 5 The United States acknowledged Arizona's violation
of the Vienna Convention and pointed to efforts to increase awareness among local
law enforcement officials of their Vienna Convention obligations.
86 While the case
was pending in the ICJ, Arizona authorities carried out the death sentence against
Walter LaGrand.87 Germany pursued a ruling by the ICJ even though both Karl and
Walter LaGrand had been executed.8
Despite the United States' vigorous argument that Article 36 does not create an
individual right, the ICJ held that "[t]he clarity of these provisions, viewed in their
context, admits of no doubt ... that Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual
rights."89 The court went on to conclude,
[we] cannot accept the argument of the United States which
proceeds, in part, on the assumption that paragraph 2 of Article 36
[that the rights under paragraph I of Article 36 should be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the
receiving state] applies only to the rights of the sending State and
not also to those of the detained individual. The Court has already
determined that Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights
for the detained person in addition to the rights accorded the
sending State, and that consequently the reference to "rights" in
paragraph 2 must be read as applying not only to the rights of the
81. Id. at 325-26.
82. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104, para. 24.
83. Id. at para. 30.
84. Lehman, supra note 80, at 325.
85. John Quigley, LaGrand: A Challenge to the US. Judiciary, 27 YALE J. INT'LL. 435, 438
(2002) (noting ICJ's judgment binding on the United States under United Nations Charter Article 94).
86. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104, para. 119.
87. Anthony N. Bishop, The Unenforceable Rights to Consular Notification and Access in the
United States: What's Changed Since the LaGrand Case?, 25 HOUS. J. INT'LL. 1, 37 (2002).
Walter LaGrand was executed March 3, 1999. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104, para. 34.
88. Bishop, supra note 87, at 37. The Republic of Paraguay sought a similar ruling from the ICJ
regarding its citizen, Angel Breard, but dropped the petition after his execution. Id. at 23. See
discussion infra Part II. C.
89. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104, para. 77.
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sending State, but also to the rights of the detained individual.9 °
Turning to the application of the doctrine of procedural default,9" the ICJ held
that while not per se violative of Article 36, procedural default operates in many
cases to deny an individual the opportunity to "challenge a conviction and sentence
by claiming, in reliance on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Convention, that the
competent national authorities failed to comply with their obligation to provide the
requisite consular notification 'without delay."' 92 The ICJ noted that procedural
default, as applied in many criminal cases, denies individuals the full spectrum of
"purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended. 9 3
These findings of the ICJ are important for two reasons. First, those courts
struggling with the question of whether Article 36 creates an individual right can
point to this solid precedent in making their decision.94 Second, this ruling
emphasizes the horns of the dilemma on which many detained foreign nationals find
themselves impaled. Not aware of the right, a violation of the Vienna Convention
goes unaddressed in the trial court, and these individuals thereafter find themselves
mired in the seemingly circular trap of American procedural default law.
The ICJ is not the only international tribunal to find an individual right in
Article 36. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has also determined that
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention creates an individual right.95 The Inter-
American Court issued an advisory opinion stating that the duty to notify a detained
foreign national of the right to seek consular assistance is owed to the individual as
part of the corpus of human rights. 96 While the United States is not a party to the
treaty that formed the Inter-American Court or to the American Convention on
90. Id. at para. 89.
91. The procedural default doctrine bars any claim raised in a habeas corpus petition filed by a
defendant convicted in state court where the habeas petitioner "fails to exhaust available state remedies
and 'the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the
exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred."' Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d
348, 356 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1998)).
92. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104, para. 90.
93. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36, para. 2, 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292-94.
94. Despite the ICJ's clear language and interpretative power, several courts' rulings subsequent
to the LaGrand decision have found either that the treaty does not create individual rights, or that the
remedy sought is not available. "The cases betray a deep skepticism of treaties as legal, rather than
political, instruments." Fitzpatrick, supra note 12, at 429.
95. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the
Due Process of Law, OC-16/99 (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Oct. 1, 1999) (on file with
author).
96. Mexico sought the Inter-American Court's Advisory Opinion based on Article 64(1) of the
American Convention on Human Rights, which authorizes members of the Organization of American
States to consult the Inter-American Court regarding interpretation of "treaties concerning the
protection of human rights in the American states." William J. Aceves, International Decision: The
Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process
of Law, 94 AM. J. INT'LL. 555, 556 (2000) (quoting American Convention on Human Rights, opened
for signature Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123).
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Human Rights, the advisory opinion is additional persuasive material for the United
States Supreme Court to consider when it chooses to address this issue.
C. Breard v. Greene
In 1998, the United States Supreme Court addressed an Article 36 violation in
Breard v. Greene.97 In 1992, Angel Francisco Breard was charged with attempted
rape and capital murder in the Commonwealth of Virginia.
98 Breard's Paraguayan
passport was located while searching his apartment, so the Commonwealth was
aware early during the proceedings that he was a foreign national.
99 Breard testified
at his trial in 1993 and was convicted on both charges and sentenced to death."
°
The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed Breard's conviction, and the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari on his direct appeal in 1994.0' At no time during
this appeal process was Breard informed of his rights under the Vienna Convention,
nor was the Republic of Paraguay aware or informed of his arrest and conviction."
In 1996, Breard filed a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
in the United States District Court, arguing, inter alia, that his conviction and
sentence should be overturned because of the alleged violation of the Vienna
Convention."0 3 The district court denied Breard's habeas petition, concluding
Breard had procedurally defaulted on this claim when he failed to raise it in state
court and that he could not show cause for, nor prejudice resulting from, this
default."° The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court,"
5 and
Breard once again petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari."°
In a hurried opinion filed on the eve of Breard's execution, the Supreme Court
rejected Breard's argument that the provisions of the Vienna Convention overrode
the procedural default rule. The Court recognized that "in international law...
absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the
forum State govern the implementation of the treaty in that State.'
1 7 The Court
further noted that the Vienna Convention itself recognized this in its own language,
which states that the rights expressed "shall be exercised in conformity with the
laws and regulations of the receiving State."'
0' Additionally, the Court found that
97. 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
98. Id. at 373.
99. Memorial of the Republic of Paraguay (Para. v. U.S.), para. 2.1 (I.C.J. Oct. 9, 1998) (on file
with author).
100. Breard, 523 U.S. at 373.
101. Id.
102. Memorial of the Republic of Paraguay (Para. v. U.S.), para. 2.15 (I.C.J. Oct. 9, 1998) (on
file with author).
103. Breard, 523 U.S. at 373.
104. Id.
105. Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 616 (4th Cir. 1998).
106. Breard, 523 U.S. at 373.
107. Id. at 375.
108. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36, para. 2, 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292.
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because Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA)0 9 long after the Treaty's ratification in 1969, the provisions of the
AEDPA modified any rights existing under the treaty." 0 The AEDPA indicates that
to warrant an evidentiary hearing, any state habeas petitioner alleging that he or she
is held in violation of treaties of the United States must develop the claim in state
court proceedings."' The Supreme Court indicated that the Vienna Convention,
"which arguably confers on an individual the right to consular assistance following
arrest,""' 2 had therefore been modified by the AEDPA and "[t]his rule prevents
Breard from establishing that the violation of his Vienna Convention rights
prejudiced him.""' 3 Even if "properly raised and proved,"" 4 the Court found it was
doubtful Breard's conviction would have been overturned absent a claim that the
Vienna Convention violation had a negative impact on his trial." 5 Breard, who was
never formally advised of his rights under the Vienna Convention," 6 was executed
on April 14, 1998 over the protest of the Republic of Paraguay." 7
Lower courts have given ample consideration to the Supreme Court's dicta that
the treaty "arguably""18 confers individual rights. Many lower courts have neatly
sidestepped the issue, perhaps hesitating in the face of this language. Several courts
have disposed of cases in an "assuming but not deciding" posture by accepting for
argument's sake that a right exists and thereafter proceeding directly to whether the
particular remedy sought by the foreign national is available. This is an awkward
hole in Vienna Convention jurisprudence because
the fact that so many courts ... have either assumed without
deciding, or discounted the need to determine, whether an
individual has rights under Article 36 leads one to question
whether the courts themselves are certain that Article 36 does not
confer individual rights. By declining to address the issue and
resolve the conflict, courts are creating confusion in the law.' 9
Perhaps the more telling portion of the Supreme Court's position may be found
in a sentence which follows the "arguably" language. The Supreme Court notes in
109. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(codified in scattered titles, mainly in 28 U.S.C.).
110. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (e)(2) (2000).
112. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 377.
115. Id.
116. Kadish, supra note 42, at 582.
117. Paraguay filed a case in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
sought intervention through diplomatic channels, and instituted a proceeding in the ICJ on April 3,
1998. Bishop, supra note 87, at 17-18.
118. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.
119. Bishop, supra note 87, at 57.
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its discussion of the AEDPA that the AEDPA's modification of 28 U.S.C. § 2254
"prevents Breard from establishing that the violation of his Vienna Convention
rights prejudiced him."' 20 In a place where the Court could have qualified its
language, it did not. This language, coupled with the Court's failure to address the
standing issue, suggests the possibility of a different result. The Court, when
presented with this issue again, may find foreign nationals have a right under this
treaty, enforceable through means as yet not determined.
The Breard case stands as a prime example of the problem with the United
States' uneven compliance with the provisions of Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention. While there is no question Breard committed the heinous crimes for
which he was convicted, there was some indication he may have rejected the
Commonwealth's offer of a plea bargain because plea bargaining did not exist in
Paraguay.' 2 ' Furthermore, the record suggests that he chose to testify not because
he wanted to declare his innocence, but rather because Paraguayan juries tend to
show leniency if defendants confess on the stand.'
22 If these assertions are true, a
defendant's decisions to take a plea offer and to testify may be crucial moments in
his interaction with the United Statesjudicial system during which a consul, familiar
with both systems of justice, could have assisted Breard. Paraguayan consular
officials could have provided essential information regarding the differences
between the United States' and Paraguayan jurisprudence that may have been
determinative of Breard's fate.' 23  In its own literature, the United States
Department of State acknowledges this crucial role of consuls for American citizens
traveling abroad, explaining that "[n]o one needs [this] cultural bridge more than
the individual U.S. citizen who has been arrested in a foreign country or imprisoned
in a foreign jail." '24 Surely this cultural bridge does not operate only for American
citizens abroad.
United States courts are not likely to alter the application of procedural default.
Nor are courts likely to apply the extraordinary judicial remedies available for
violations of fundamental rights. As noted above, those courts that determine a
right exists hold that the right is not a fundamental right; therefore, these
extraordinary remedies are not available. It is also highly unlikely that courts will
cull back through the many convictions of foreign nationals to determine whether
a violation of Article 36 occurred and whether the violation prejudiced the
120. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376 (emphasis added).
121. See Memorial of the Republic of Paraguay (Para. v. U.S.), paras. 2.6, 2.11 (I.C.J. Oct. 9,
1998) (on file with author).
122. See Kadish, supra note 42, at 582 n. 109 (explaining that "Breard believed he had committed
a crime under a satanic curse," and in South American courts, this belief is "mitigating evidence in the
sentencing phase").
123. There is also some indication Breard did not trust his attorneys because of the language and
cultural barrier. Bishop, supra note 87, at 17. This is undoubtedly another area in which a consul could
have provided assistance.
124. Aceves, supra note 4, at 271-72 (quoting 7 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MANuAL § 491 (1984)).
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particular case. Individuals are therefore left with a question that has plagued
defendants and courts for some time: while there may be a right, where is the
remedy for this treaty's infringement?
D. Goose and Gander: The Official United States Position
The United States takes the position that Article 36 creates a right that is
enforceable only by and among nations, and that no individual right accrues to the
detained foreign national. 25 The United States Department of State asserts that the
only remedies for failure to grant consular access and notification under the Vienna
Convention are "'diplomatic, political, or exist between states under international
law.""' 12 6 This current view is consistent with the position taken by the Executive
Branch during treaty ratification proceedings. 27 Therefore, according to the State
Department, the only available remedies under Article 36 are investigations into
alleged violations and apologies to the affected nations. 128
The United States did not take the above stated position when it sought access
to the hostages taken from the United States embassy in Tehran, Iran, in November
1979, or when the United States sought access to individuals detained by
Nicaragua 129 and Syria. 30 In these situations, the United States demanded access
to its citizens pursuant to the very provisions of the Vienna Convention it chooses
to ignore when the situation is reversed. While the argument can be made in these
situations that the United States sought to enforce the treaty as a sovereign
demanding the right of access, the underlying premise remains the same: the weight
of sovereign power operates to protect the individual. In a sprawling country such
as the United States, where individuals are dispersed among many states and no
unified law enforcement system exists, foreign sovereigns can only protect their
citizens with a right of access originating in the individual.',
Also contrary to its stated position, the United States has indicated through a
variety of actions and publications that Article 36 does in fact create individual
125. See United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 63 (lst Cir. 2000).
126. United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 392 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v.
Page, 232 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2000)).
127. Li, 206 F.3d at 64-65.
128. United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2000).
129. See United States v. Superville, 40 F. Supp. 2d 672, 676 n.3 (noting U.S. interventions in
these matters).
130. Aceves, supra note 4, at 270-71.
131. It is interesting to note that a few states have moved to codify the requirements of Article
36 of the Vienna Convention. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 834c (West 2003) (codifying various
responsibilities under the Vienna Convention); H.R. 2047, 72d Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2003)
(enacted May 28, 2003) (amending various sections of Oregon statutes to comply with requirements
of Vienna Convention). Also, Texas has produced a sixty-seven page manual outlining requirements,
procedures, and forms to be used in compliance with Article 36. Greg Abbott, Attorney Gen. of Tex.,
Magistrate 's Guide to Consular Notification Under the Vienna Convention (on file with author).
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rights. State Department materials,'32 regulations promulgated by federal
agencies, 133 and material contained in bilateral agreements with foreign nations
134
demonstrate that the United States expects that its citizens will receive their rights
of consular access if arrested overseas and that its own law enforcement officials
will comply with the provisions of Article 36. Unfortunately, even among the
federal agencies that have promulgated explicit regulations regarding notification
of foreign nationals, continuing violations 3 1 of the Vienna Convention indicate that
this "requirement" of notification is inconsistent. "[W]hen federal officials argue
against ajudicial remedy in federal court for violations of the Vienna Convention,
which their own regulations seek to enforce, their commitment to ensuring
compliance with Article 36 seems dubious at best.'
' 36
IV. REMEDY
Foreign nationals have a right with no discemable remedy when faced with
state or federal officials' violations of the Vienna Convention. Those courts that
have determined that an individual right exists in Article 36 have held that this right
is not a fundamental right. 137 This finding relegates these cases to review under the
"harmless error" standard; 31 the affected individual must therefore make a showing
of prejudice to the outcome of his or her case to overcome the violation by the
government. For the affected individual, Article 3 6 violations seem insurmountable
132. The State Department provides periodic "notices to state and local authorities reminding
them of their obligations under the Treaty." Kadish, supra note 42, at 599. The State Department also
publishes a Foreign Affairs Manual outlining the rights of American citizens arrested overseas,
including "'the arrestee's right to communicate with the American consul."' Id. (quoting U.S. DEPT.
OF STATE, 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 411.1 (1984)).
133. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e) (2003) (indicating "detained alien shall be notified that he or she may
communicate with the consular" officials); 28 C.F.R. § 50.5 (2003) (indicating in a policy statement
of the Department of Justice that the arresting officer "shall inform the foreign national that his consul
will be advised of his arrest unless he does not wish such notification to be given").
134. Kadish, supra note 42, at 600 (citing Memorandum ofUnderstanding on Consular Protection
of Mexican and United States Nationals, May 7, 1996, para. 2).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Ovalle, No. 02 Cr. 975, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1426 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 3, 2003) (noting defendant was not advised of his rights when he was arrested on drug charges in
2002); United States v. Pineda, 57 Fed. Appx. 4, 6 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding the defendant "was not
orally advised" of his rights under Article 36 after being arrested on state charges in 1997, and at a
suppression hearing on January 9, 2001, district court found defendant "was never advised" of his
Article 36 rights).
136. Bishop, supra note 87, at 58.
137. See, e.g., Waldron v. INS, 17 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[W]e decline to equate such
a provision with fundamental rights.").
138. Harmless error review is governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a). This rule
provides that "(a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must
be disregarded." FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). "Although this Rule by its terms applies to all errors where
a proper objection is made at trial, [there is] a limited class of fundamental constitutional errors that
'defy analysis by "harmless error" standards."' Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999) (quoting
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991)).
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in the criminal arena. Direct appeals fall short because courts view violations of the
treaty as harmless, and habeas corpus proceedings are foreclosed to the
consideration of a violation because of procedural default. The lingering question
remains: while there is a right, what is the remedy?
A. Remedies under Treaties
Generally, if a treaty affords an individual a remedy, the Supremacy Clause
ensures that the individual receives that remedy.'39 The Vienna Convention,
however, is silent as to a remedy for a violation of Article 36, and courts have been
unwilling to afford remedies ordinarily available in criminal cases where there is
egregious prosecutorial misconduct or ineptitude.
Treaties, as agreements between nations, are governed under the norms of
customary international law. When violations of treaties occur, customary
international law determines the instances in which parties to the treaty may rescind
or take other measures in response to the violation. 40 As with the Vienna
Convention, if a treaty does not specify a remedy, the customary remedy under
international law is the restoration of the status quo ante. 4' This would equate to
suppression of evidence. 42 As noted above, however, suppression is not a remedy
criminal courts are willing to recognize as a cure for these violations. As one
criminal court noted, "[i]f the Vienna Convention does not expressly provide for a
remedy.., it is not the proper role of [courts] to 'connect the dots' and thus create
one."' 43 Therefore, a remedy for violations may not lie in the criminal arena but
rather in the recognition and enforcement of a civil remedy.
B. Finding a Civil Remedy: 42 U.S. C. § 1983
State and federal violations of Article 36 continue to occur, despite the many
cases and scholarly articles alerting the legal community to this treaty and its
implications. Even judges and practitioners are unaware of the treaty and its
provisions ." Foreign nationals will make the same unsuccessful arguments in
139. Vazquez, supra note 51, at 1157.
140. Id.
141. United States v. Torres-Del Muro, 58 F. Supp. 2d 931,934 (C.D. Ill. 1999) (citing RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 901 cmt. d (1987)).
142. Id.
143. United States v. Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 n.13 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
144. Bishop, supra note 87, at 28 (noting that during oral argument of a death penalty appeal, two
Fourth Circuit judges and the Virginia Assistant Attorney General were "unaware of the Vienna
Convention prior to [the case in question]"). Even as late as 1999, while arguing the motion to
withdraw the guilty plea in the Lopez matter, the assistant solicitor remarked, "I did [not) even know
this [treaty] existed and in fact called the Attorney General's office today, and the person I spoke to
spoke to several other attorneys down there, and none of them knew about it either, including the
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criminal cases for many years to come unless there is some method of enforcement
that brings the treaty into the consciousness of the law enforcement community.
Individuals challenging Article 36 violations currently find themselves without a
remedy for law enforcement personnel's continued ignorance of their obligations
under the Vienna Convention.
If there is a right, surely there is a remedy. As Justice Holmes observed, "[legal
obligations that exist but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law but
... are elusive to the grasp."'45 Early English and American jurisprudence includes
the adage "[w]here there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or
action at law, whenever that right is invaded."'16 Even if the language of Article 36
does not provide a specific remedy, "courts have rarely, if ever, felt themselves so
restrained by technical rules that they could not fid some remedy, consistent with
the law, for acts, whether done by government or by individual persons, that
violated natural justice."' 47 The law in this regard is well-settled: while there is not
a remedy for every wrong, where there is a right recognized at law, there exists a
remedy.
Although it may seem an empty remedy for those individuals fighting criminal
convictions,'4 8 an effective vehicle may exist to promote enforcement in the civil
arena through a civil action based in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This statute provides in part
that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.. .. '
The language of Section 1983 provides a cause of action not just for United
States citizens, but also for any person within the jurisdiction of the United States,
including foreign nationals. Suits under Section 1983 would address violations by
state and local law enforcement, while suits brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six
145. Exparte The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922).
146. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 23).
147. Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177, 195 (1910).
148. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (holding § 1983 suit cannot be used by
individuals seeking to end or shorten confinement).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics' would address
violations of the treaty by federal law enforcement agents. Sovereign immunity
does not protect a United States official if his action is challenged as
unconstitutional or contrary to law or treaty,'' and as such, the official's actions
could be remedied under a civil action brought pursuant to Bivens.
Two recent civil cases applying Section 1983 reached different results. In
Sorensen v. City of New York,' 52 the first court'5' to address the issue of whether a
remedy is available under this statute found that a party may not bring suit under
Section 1983, whereas in Standtv. City ofNew York,154 a different court reached the
opposite conclusion. In Sorensen, decided before the ICJ's ruling in LaGrand, the
court found that the treaty did not provide for individually enforceable rights
because the language of the treaty does not "provid[e] for civil liability under
Article 36."'"5 The court based its decision on the language of the treaty itself,
which it construes as not "intend[ing] to confer enforceable rights upon
individuals.' 5 6 The Sorensen court collapsed the issues of standing and the
existence of a judicially enforceable private right into one question'57 and then
reached the merits of plaintiffs' claims by equating a remedy under Section 1983
with the remedy of suppression of evidence. '58 However, as the Standt court noted,
"The remedy of civil damages for a plaintiff who alleges he was unlawfully
detained without consular notification is much less 'drastic' than suppressing
incriminatory evidence or dismissing an indictment against a properly charged
criminal defendant."5 9
In Standt, the outcome was different. On January 27, 1999, police arrested
plaintiff Frank Standt, a German citizen, for driving under the influence. 60 At the
time of his arrest, officials were aware of his nationality,' 6' but did not advise Standt
of any rights under the Vienna Convention."' While in police custody, Standt
alleged that the police denied his requested contact with the German Consulate and
that police officers assaulted him.'63 Standt did eventually contact the German
150. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens held that federal agents, acting under color of authority, can
be held liable for "damages consequent upon [their] unconstitutional conduct." Id. at 389. This
parallels the cause of action provided for in § 1983, which applies to state actors.
151. See ExParte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 124 (1908).
152. No. 98 Civ. 3356 (HB), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15090 (S.D.N.Y Jan. 23, 2000).
153. Id. at *8.
154. 153 F. Supp. 2d417 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
155. Sorensen, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15090, at *18.
156. Id. at* 12.
157. Id. at *9.
158. Id. at* 16.
159. Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 429.
160. Id. at 419-20.
161. When asked to produce his driver's license, Standt produced his German driver's license and
his passport. Id. at 419.
162. Id. at 420.
163. Id. The court noted that almost all the facts in this case were heavily contested. Id. at 419.
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Consulate, 64 and after hiring private counsel, appeared in traffic court where the
traffic citations that had been issued to him were dismissed. 65 The Standt court
determined that the language and history of the Vienna Convention suggest that
"Article 36 of the Vienna Convention was intended to provide a private right of
action to individuals detained by foreign officials."'' 66 Further, the court found that
Standt could pursue an affirmative claim for violation of his rights under Section
1983 because as a ratified treaty the Vienna Convention is enforceable pursuant to
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.6 7 The court noted that
Section 1983 "provides a cause of action to redress the deprivation 'of any rights
... secured by the constitution and laws' of the United States, not only fundamental
or Constitutional rights.' 68 Instead of being limited by the showing of prejudice
required in criminal cases, a plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 suit under the Vienna
Convention "need only show that the violation injured him.'
1 69
Since Sorensen and Standt, only a handful of civil cases have dealt with the
redressability of Vienna Convention violations under Section 1983.1"° However,
as litigation in this area increases, litigants will use the Standt decision coupled with
the ICJ ruling in LaGrand and the Supreme Court's language in Breard to force
recognition of the right created under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.
V. CONCLUSION
Treaties function effectively because of the underlying premise of reciprocity.
The United States cannot continue down the path of erratic compliance with the
Vienna Convention. The "freedom and safety [of Americans traveling abroad] are
seriously endangered if [law enforcement officials in the United States] fail to honor
the Vienna Convention and other nations follow their example."'' Civil actions
under Section 1983 and Bivens will promote the consistency required in our
international agreements. The United States is bound by the full force of the Vienna
164. It was not until he was at a hospital for a psychological evaluation that a nurse contacted the
German Consulate on his behalf. Standt v. City of New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 421 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
165. Id. at 421. The driving under the influence ticket was voided after Standt produced a breath-
alyzer result from the police station of 0.00%, but he was subsequently issued tickets for driving
without a seatbelt and driving without a valid license. Id. at 420-21.
166. Id. at 427.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 428 (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997)).
169. Standt v. City of New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417,430 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
170. See, e.g.. Anthony v. City of New York, No. 00 Civ. 4688, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7189,
at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25,2002) (denying plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint under Rule 15(a)
because Standt did not create a new cause of action under § 1983; rather, Standt "merely confirmed that
such a cause of action exists"); Ulmann v. Anderson, No. 02-405-JD Civ., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 874,
at *1 (D.N.H. Jan. 21, 2003) (allowing a prisoner's § 1983 petition alleging an Article 36 violation to
survive initial review).
171. Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J., concurring).
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Convention. If the United States did not intend to comply with or had reservations
regarding Article 36, it could have noted exceptions to the language when it became
a signatory, which it did not do. 17 2 The United States should stand behind its
agreement and promote compliance with this treaty in all levels of law enforcement,
from the Department of Justice to the local sheriff.
Now more than ever, the United States should clear its jurisprudence of any
ghosts that may haunt its citizens and own national interests. As the Supreme Court
noted, "'[h]e that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy






172. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. at 322, 596 U.N.T.S. at 451.
173. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 688 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 588 (P. Foner ed. 1945)).
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